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Research questionHow can affine maximizer auctions extract revenue from correlated valuations while preserving truthfulness and individual rationality?Fixed payment rules can restrict revenue when bidders’ valuations are correlated. More expressive payments must still preserve truthful reporting and acceptable participation.
Economics
Multi-agent Systems
Latest papersRecent research connected to this question, newest first.Enhancing Affine Maximizer Auctions with Correlation-Aware PaymentThe source develops a correlation-aware payment extension for affine maximizer auctions, proves preservation of dominant-strategy truthfulness, and formulates revenue optimization subject to individual rationality. It provides theoretical analysis and experiments over valuation distributions.research paper · Sep 4, 2026
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