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Research questionHow can sellers maximize revenue from information schemes while satisfying obedience and incentive constraints in multi-buyer data markets?A data seller must choose what information to reveal and how to price it while buyers remain willing to follow the recommended actions and have incentives to participate honestly. Multiple buyers make this difficult because one buyer’s information can affect another’s value.
AI
Economics
Machine Learning
Multi-agent Systems
Latest papersRecent research connected to this question, newest first.Data Market Design through Deep LearningThe source studies statistical-experiment design for revenue-optimal data markets, with buyer downstream actions, prices, obedience constraints, and incentive constraints on bids. Its deep-learning experiments replicate known theoretical solutions, extend to more complex settings, and support conjectures about new optimal designs; no particular deployment or access model is specified.research paper · Sep 2, 2026
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