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Research questionHow can stable marriage matching improve equity while preserving stability under rank-based utilities?Stable matching can protect participants from blocking deviations yet distribute outcomes unevenly. The challenge is to improve equity across rank-based utilities without abandoning stability.
Multi-agent Systems
Latest papersRecent research connected to this question, newest first.Fair Stable Matching: A Nash Social Welfare ApproachApplies to the classic stable marriage problem with preference rankings interpreted as utilities. The source provides an algorithmic treatment and empirical results across diverse preference distributions, including comparisons with regret, egalitarian, and sex-equality measures.research paper · Sep 2, 2026
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